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Abstract
We develop a general framework, based on Boltzmann transport
theory, to analyze the distribution of wealth in societies. Within this
framework we derive the distribution function of wealth by using a
two-party trading model for the poor people while for the rich peo-
ple a new model is proposed where interaction with wealthy enti-
ties (huge reservoir) is relevant. At equilibrium, the interaction with
wealthy entities gives a power-law (Pareto-like) behavior in the wealth
distribution while the two-party interaction gives a Boltzmann-Gibbs
distribution.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Inequality in the distribution of wealth in the population of a nation has
provoked a lot of studies. It is important for both economists and physicists
to understand the root cause on this inequality: whether stochasticity or a
loaded dice is the main culprit for such a lop-sided distribution. While it
has been empirically observed by Pareto [1] that the higher wealth group
distribution has a power-law tail with exponent varying between 2 and 3,
2the lower wealth group distribution is exponential or Boltzmann-Gibb’s like
[2, 3]. The Boltzmann-Gibb’s law has been shown to be obtainable when
trading between two people, in the absence of any savings, is totally random
[4, 5, 6]. The constant finite savings case has been studied earlier numeri-
cally by Chakraborti and Chakrabarti [4] and later analytically by us [5]. As
regards the fat tail in the wealth distribution, several researchers have ob-
tained Pareto-like behavior using approaches such as random savings [7, 8],
inelastic scattering [9], generalized Lotka Volterra dynamics [10], analogy
with directed polymers in random media [11], and three parameter based
trade-investment model [12].
In this paper, we try to identify the processes that lead to the wealth
distribution in societies. Our model involves two types of trading processes
– tiny and gross. The tiny process involves trading between two individuals
while the gross one involves trading between an individual and the gross-
system. The philosophy is that small wealth distribution is governed by
two-party trading while the large wealth distribution involves big players
interacting with the gross-system. The poor are mainly involved in trading
with other poor individuals. Whereas the big players mainly interact with
large entities/organizations such as government(s), markets of nations, etc.
These large entities/organizations are treated as making up the gross-system
in our model. The gross-system is thus a huge reservoir of wealth. Hence,
our model invokes the tiny channel at small wealths while at large wealths
the gross channel gets turned on.
2 GENERAL FRAMEWORK
We will now develop a formalism similar to Boltzmann transport theory
so as to obtain the distribution function f(y, y˙, t) for wealth y, net income
y˙ (or total income after consumption) as a function of time t. Similar to
3Boltzmann’s postulate we also postulate a dynamic law of the form
∂f
∂t
=
{
∂f
∂t
}
ext source
+
{
∂f
∂t
}
interaction
. (1)
The first term on the right hand side (RHS) describes the evolution due to
external income sources only, while the second one represents contribution
from entirely internal interactions.
2.1 Model for tiny-trading
Individuals, possessing wealth smaller than a cutoff wealth yc, engage in
two-party trading where two individuals 1 and 2 put forth a fraction of their
wealth (1 − λt)y1 and (1 − λt)y2 respectively [with 0 ≤ λt < 1]. Then the
total money (1− λt)(y1 + y2) is randomly distributed between the two. The
total money between the two is conserved in the two-party trading process.
We assume that probability of trading by individuals having certain money
is proportional to the number of individuals with that money.
Since in a two-party trading there is no external income source, then{
∂f
∂t
}
ext source
= 0. The second term on the RHS in Eq. (1) can be obtained
as follows in terms of a balance equation.
∂f
∂t
=
{
∂f
∂t
}
interaction
= gains− losses. (2)
In Eq. (2) the two terms on the RHS can be expressed in terms of transition
rates r(y1, y2; y
′
1, y
′
2) for a pair of persons to go from moneys y1, y2 to moneys
y′1, y
′
2 respectively. Then, we have on assuming that the distribution function
is only a function of wealth and time,
∂f(y1, t)
∂t
=
∫
r(y′1, y
′
2; y1, y2)f(y
′
1, t)f(y
′
2, t)dy2dy
′
1dy
′
2
−
∫
r(y1, y2; y
′
1, y
′
2)f(y1, t)f(y2, t)dy2dy
′
1dy
′
2. (3)
In the above equation, conservation law requires that y1+y2 = y
′
1+y
′
2. Hence
in the first integral we treat y2 as redundant and integrate out with respect
4to it to yield a normalization constant. Similarly in the second integral y′2 is
integrated out. Now for the transition rate in the first integral of the above
equation we have
r(y′1, y
′
2; y1, y2) ∝
1
(1− λt)(y′1 + y
′
2)
, (4)
if λty
′
1 ≤ y1 ≤ y
′
1+(1−λt)y
′
2 and zero otherwise. On taking into account the
restriction that no one can have negative money and setting y′1+ y
′
2 = L, the
first integral in Eq. (3) at equilibrium is proportional to
∫
∞
y1
dL
∫ b(y1,L,λt)
a(y1,L,λt)
dy′1F(y
′
1, L, λt), (5)
where
a(y1, L, λt) ≡ max[0, {y1 − (1− λt)L}/λt],
b(y1, L, λt) ≡ min[L, y1/λt],
and
F(y′1, L, λt) ≡
f(y′1)f(L− y
′
1)
(1− λt)L
.
As regards the second integral in Eq. (3), at equilibrium we assume that the
transition from y1 to all other levels is proportional to f(y1). Also, since at
equilibrium ∂f(y1,t)
∂t
= 0, we obtain the distribution function to be
f(y) =
∫
∞
y
dL
∫ b(y,L,λt)
a(y,L,λt)
dxF(x, L, λt). (6)
The above result was obtained earlier by us using an alternate route [5].
On introducing an upper cutoff yc for the two-party trading, the contri-
bution to the distribution function f(y) from the tiny channel becomes
γ
∫
∞
y
dL
∫ b(y,L,λt)
a(y,L,λt)
dxF(x, L, λt)H(x, L, yc). (7)
5In the above equation
H(x, L, yc) ≡ [1− θ(x− yc)][1− θ(L− x− yc)],
with θ(x) being the unit step function and γ = 1/
∫ yc
0 dxf(x) is a normal-
ization constant introduced to account for the less than unity value of the
probability of picking a person below yc.
2.2 Model for gross-trading
Next, we will analyze the contribution to the distribution function f(y) from
gross-trading. An individual possessing wealth larger than a cutoff wealth
(yc) trades with a fraction (1−λg) of his wealth y with the gross-system. The
latter puts forth an equal amount of money (1− λg)y. The trading involves
the total sum 2(1− λg)y being randomly distributed between the individual
and the reservoir. Thus on an average the gross-system’s wealth is conserved.
When only the gross-trading channel is operative, we have
∂f(y1, t)
∂t
=
∫
r(y′1; y1)f(y
′
1, t)dy
′
1
−
∫
r(y1; y
′
1)f(y1, t)dy
′
1, (8)
where r(y′1; y1) is the transition rate from y
′
1 to y1 through interaction with
the reservoir. Total money involved in trading (between individual and the
gross-system) is 2y′1(1−λg). After interaction, the resulting money y1 of the
individual satisfies the following constraints λgy
′
1 ≤ y1 ≤ (2 − λg)y
′
1. The
first transition rate in the above equation is given by
r(y′1, ; y1) ∝
1
2y′1(1− λg)
, (9)
if λgy
′
1 ≤ y1 ≤ (2 − λg)y
′
1 and zero otherwise. As before, at equilibrium
the second integral in Eq. (8) is proportional to f(y1) when only the gross
channel is operative. Then the distribution function f(y) is given by
f(y) =
∫ y/λg
y/(2−λg)
dxf(x)
2x(1− λg)
. (10)
6Now it is interesting to note that the solution of the above equation is given
by f(y) = c/yn. To obtain n one then solves the equation
(2− λg)
n − λng = 2n(1− λg), (11)
and obtains n = 1, 2. Only n = 2 is a realistic solution because it gives a
finite cumulative probability. It is of interest to note that the solution is
independent of λg. Also, clearly the distribution function makes sense only
for y > 0. On taking into account an upper cutoff yc, the contribution to the
distribution function f(y) from the gross channel is
∫ y/λg
y/(2−λg)
dxf(x)
2x(1− λg)
θ(x− yc). (12)
2.3 Hybrid model
Here an individual possessing wealth larger than a cutoff wealth yc does
trading with the gross-system, while individuals possessing wealth smaller
than yc engage in two-party tiny-trading. Hence from Eqs. (7) and (12), the
distribution function is obtained to be
f(y) = γ
∫
∞
y
dL
∫ b(y,L,λt)
a(y,L,λt)
dxF(x, L, λt)H(x, L, yc)
+
∫ y/λg
y/(2−λg)
dxf(x)
2x(1− λg)
θ(x− yc). (13)
Now, it must be pointed out that when the savings λt = 0, λg 6= 0, and
y → 0, Eq. (13) yields (up to a proportionality constant) the following same
result as the purely tiny-trading case without an upper cutoff [5]:
f ′(y) ∝ −f(y)f(0). (14)
In obtaining the above equation we again assumed that the function f(y)
and its first and second derivatives are well behaved. Then the solution for
small y is given by
f(y) ∝ f(0)exp[−yf(0)]. (15)
73 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The distribution function f(y) can be obtained by solving the nonlinear inte-
gral Eq. (13). To this end, we simplify Eq. (13) for computational purposes
as follows:
f(y) = γG(y, λt, yc)
∫ 2yc
y
dL
∫ b(y,L,λt)
a(y,L,λt)
dxF(x, L, λt)H(x, L, yc)
+[1− θ(y − yas)]
∫ y/λg
y/(2−λg)
dxf(x)
2x(1− λg)
θ(x− yc)
+θ(y − yas)f(yas)
y2as
y2
, (16)
where G(y, λt, yc) ≡ 1 − θ[y − (2 − λt)yc] and y > yas gives the asymptotic
behavior f(y) ∝ 1/y2. In our calculations, we have taken yas to be at least
20yc and obtained f(y) for all y less than 2000 times the average wealth
per person yav. We solved Eq. (16) iteratively by choosing a trial function,
substituting it on the RHS and obtaining a new trial function and successively
substituting the new trial functions over and over again on the RHS until
convergence is achieved. The criterion for convergence was that the difference
between the new trial function fn and the previous trial function fp satisfies
the accuracy test
∑
i |fn(yi)− fp(yi)|/
∑
i fp(yi) ≤ 0.002 [13].
In Fig. 1, using a log-log plot we depict the distribution function f(y) for
the constant savings case λt = λg = 0.5 with the average money per person
yav being set to unity and with the values of the wealth cutoff yc = 3, 5, 10.
As expected, for larger values of yc, the Pareto-like 1/y
2 behavior sets in later.
The transition to purely gross-trading occurs at (2− λt)yc, while below λgyc
it is purely two-party tiny-trading. Thus the transition from purely tiny-
trading to purely gross-trading occurs in Fig. 1 over a region of width yc.
However, all the tails merge irrespective of the cutoff. At smaller values of y
the behavior of f(y), depicted in the inset, is similar to the purely two-party
trading model studied earlier (see Ref. [5]). The curves in the inset appear
to be close because here the trading is two-party and is governed by the same
8 1e-08
 1e-07
 1e-06
 1e-05
 1e-04
 0.001
 0.01
 0.1
 1
 0.01  0.1  1  10  100  1000
f(y
)
y
λt = λg = 0.5; yc = 3yav  λt = λg = 0.5; yc = 5yav  λt = λg = 0.5; yc = 10yav
 0
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 0  0.5  1  1.5
Figure 1: Plot of the wealth distribution function for savings λt = λg = 0.5
and various wealth cutoff values yc = 3, 5, 10. The average money per person
yav is set to unity. The dotted lines are guides to the eye.
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Figure 2: Wealth distribution f(y) at average wealth yav = 1, wealth cutoff
yc = 5, and various values of savings λt = λg = 0.1, 0.5, 0.8.
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Figure 3: Money distribution function at zero savings for tiny-trading and
various savings values λg = 0.2, 0.5, 0.9 for the gross-trading. The average
money yav = 1 and the wealth cutoff yc = 5.
savings. Next, in Fig. 2 we plot f(y) with the cutoff yc = 5, yav = 1, and
for values of savings fraction λt = λg = λ = 0.1, 0.5, 0.8. Here the power-law
behavior (1/y2) takes over for y > (2 − λ)yc and hence at lower savings it
sets in later. In the power-law region the curves merge together. As shown
in the inset of Fig. 2, at smaller values of y the f(y)s become zero with the
higher peaked curves (corresponding to larger λs) approaching zero faster
similar to the case of the purely two-party trading model in our earlier work
[5]. Here the transition from purely tiny- to purely gross-trading at higher
λ is sharper because the transition occurs over a region of width 2(1− λ)yc.
Lastly, in Fig. 3, we show the distribution function f(y) for the zero savings
case in the tiny-channel (λt = 0) and for various savings λg = 0.2, 0.5, 0.9 in
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the gross-channel with yav = 1 and yc = 5. The distribution, as expected,
decays exponentially (or Boltzmann-Gibbs-like) for small values of y and has
power-law (1/y2) behavior at large values. The curves merge in the Pareto-
like region and, in fact, f(y) ≈ 0.1/y2 in all the three figures at large values
of y. In Fig. 3 too, for reasons mentioned earlier, the transition is sharper at
larger values of λg. Fig. 3 takes into account the fact that, in societies, the
rich tend to have higher savings fraction (λ) compared to the poor. Actually,
if the savings fraction were to increase gradually with wealth, one can expect
a more gradual change in the transition region of the distribution rather than
the sharp local maxima (around y ≈ 6.5 ) shown by the λg = 0.9 curve.
In all the figures anomalous looking kinks/shoulders appear at the cross
over between the Boltzmann-Gibbs-like and the Pareto-like regimes. This
is due to the sharp cut-off at yc that we introduced using a step function.
However, a kink seems to be generic in these kind of distributions in real pop-
ulations (as borne out by the empirical data in Fig. 9 of Ref. [2]) indicating
that two different dynamics may be operative in the two regimes. Different
societies have the onset of Pareto-like behavior at different wealths which is
indicative that the cut-off has to be obtained empirically based on various
factors like the social structure, welfare policies, type of markets, form of
government, etc.
In Japan the wealth/income distribution vanishes at zero wealth/income
and then rises to a maximum (see Ref. [2]). In US the distribution seems to
be a maximum at zero wealth/income (see Ref. [2]). Both these aspects can
be covered in our model as the poor in general are known to save very little.
If their savings are zero, one gets the Boltzmann-Gibbs behavior at the poor
end. On the other hand, if the savings are small one gets a maximum close
to zero and the distribution vanishes at zero wealth.
It would be interesting to deduce the savings pattern from the wealth
distribution. While it has been observed that the rich tend to save more
than the poor, how gradually the savings change as wealth increases can
12
perhaps be inferred from the change in slope. However, as explained below,
the middle region (involving the middle-class) has been modeled quite crudely
by us and needs to be refined before a serious connection with savings pattern
can be attempted.
We will now further discuss the motivation for using two different mech-
anisms to model the observed wealth distribution. The model is an approx-
imation where the direct wealth exchange occurs between people who are
in economic proximity. At the poorer end of the spectrum, the poor, who
have limited economic means and avenues, come in contact with a few poor
and their economic activity is modeled in terms of two-party trading. At
the other end of the wealth spectrum, the rich have access to various eco-
nomic avenues (e.g., markets, know-how, work force, capital, credit facilities,
contacts, wealthy society, etc.) due to which they can trade with huge or-
ganizations and are thus modeled to interact with a reservoir. As regards
the middle-class that is between the rich and the poor, they trade amongst
themselves as well as with the poor and the reservoir. As a first step towards
realizing this scenario, we included in our model only the two extreme cases
of interaction. What we have not taken into account is the interaction of
the middle class with the reservoir. To rectify this, in future we hope to
introduce a cutoff yg for the interaction with the reservoir such that yg lies
below the two-party trading cutoff yt. Thus, we believe that our model is a
reasonable one at the poor and rich ends and is a crude approximation for
the middle class. While it is true that the poor also come in market contact
with wealthy organizations like the coke company, the contact is an indirect
one through intermediaries. For example, the poor person deals with a richer
shop-keeper selling coke who in turn deals with a richer local distributor who
in turn deals with the big coke company. Lastly, we would like to add that
the assumption of random distribution in two-party trading is a model stud-
ied by others as well (see Refs. [4, 7]). We feel that in any trading there is
random fluctuation of the price around its true value. The total money put
13
forth for trading corresponds to the amount of random fluctuation. However
the poorer of the two puts forth less and makes the trading biased in his/her
favor. This can be justified from the fact that the poor people are constantly
looking for bargains to make ends meet.
Compared to other types of analyses involving two-party trading to ex-
plain Pareto law (see Refs. [7, 8]), our gross-trading mechanism can make
contact with the standard approach in macroeconomics as will be shown
below. Over the past, economists have developed two models, namely, the
dynastic model and the life-cycle model, to explain wealth distribution. In
the dynastic model, where bequests are vehicles of transmission of wealth
inequality, people save to improve the consumption of their descendants. On
the other hand, in the life-cycle model, where wealth of an individual is a
function of the age, people save to provide for their own consumption after re-
tirement. Both these models and their hybrid versions have had only limited
success [14]. However, one of the ingredients that goes into these models,
i.e., uninsurable shocks or stochasticity in income, has been exploited by
econophysicists with remarkable success in reproducing power-law tails.
In macroeconomics, the objective is to maximize a cumulative utility func-
tion subject to a wealth constraint [15]. Mathematically this is formulated
as
max
ct+i,yt+i
Et
∑
i
βiu(ct+i), (17)
subject to the constraint
yt+i = (1 + r)yt+i−1 + et+i − ct+i, (18)
where ct, yt, and et are consumption, wealth, and labor earnings respectively
at time t, r is the interest rate on wealth y, 0 < β < 1 is the time-discount
factor, u(ct) is the concave utility function, Et is the expectation value based
on the available information at time t. Using the method of Lagrange mul-
tipliers, the conditions of optimality yield
Et[u
′(ct)− (1 + r)βu
′(ct+1)] = 0, (19)
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where u′(ct) is the derivative of u(ct) with respect to ct. From the above
equation we see that consumption at different times are related. In our work
[see Eq. (9)], we introduced the stochasticity
yt+1 − yt = ǫ(1− λg)yt, (20)
where ǫ is a random number with −1 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1, which implies that
ryt + et+1 − ct+1 = ǫ(1− λg)yt. (21)
The above equation can be made consistent with the optimal consumption
relation given by Eq. (19). Thus our results can be approached through the
standard machinery in macroeconomics.
The stochasticity in wealth given by Eq. (20) implies that the spread
in wealth distribution at time t + 1 is proportional to yt and thus wealth’s
yt+1 > yt yield a wider spread for yt+2 than do wealth’s yt+1 < yt. Thus the
distribution becomes more skewed to the right.
In conclusion, we introduced a new ingredient – interaction of the rich
with huge entities – and obtained a Pareto-like power-law. On the other
hand, the Boltzmann-Gibbs-like wealth distribution of the poorer part of the
society is explained through a two-party trading mechanism. All in all, we
demonstrate that stochasticity can account for the observed skewness in the
wealth distribution.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors are grateful to B. K. Chakrabarti for useful discussions.
References
[1] V. Pareto, Cours d’Economie Politique, (Lausanne, 1897).
[2] A. A. Dragulescu, cond-mat/0307341.
15
[3] G. Willis and J. Mimkes, cond-mat/0406694.
[4] A. Chakraborti and B. K. Chakrabarti, Eur. Phys. J. B 17, 167 (2000).
[5] A. Das and S. Yarlagadda, Physica Scripta T 106, 39 (2003).
[6] A. A. Dragulescu and V. M. Yakovenko, Eur. Phys. J. B 17, 723 (2000).
[7] A. Chatterjee, B. K. Chakrabarti, and S. S. Manna, Physica Scripta T
106, 36 (2003).
[8] A. Chatterjee, B. K. Chakrabarti, and S. S. Manna, Physica A 335,
155 (2004).
[9] F. Slanina, Phs. Rev. E 69, 046102 (2004).
[10] S. Solomon and P. Richmond, Physica A 299, 188 (2001).
[11] J.-P. Bouchaud and M. Me´zard, Physica A 282, 536 (2000).
[12] N. Scafetta, S. Picozzi, and B. J. West, cond-mat/0403045.
[13] In Fig. 2, only for the λt = λg = 0.8 curve, we choose
∑
i |fn(yi) −
fp(yi)|/
∑
i fp(yi) ≤ 0.008 to cut down computational time.
[14] V. Quadrini and J.-V. Rı´os-Rull, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Quarterly Review, 21 (2), 22 (Spring 1997).
[15] C. A. Favero, Apllied Macroeconometrics (Oxford university press, New
York, 2001).
